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Patenting and Industrial Performance: The Case of the Machine Tool Industry
by Manfred Fleischer
Using the case of an important capital goods industry the paper examines the impact of
the national patent system on the performance of firms. Many theories attempt to explain
the firms’ innovative behavior using the concepts of national and sectorial systems of
innovation. The patent law plays a particularly important role in these systems. At the
level of the firm its importance rests on the possibility to appropriate profits. An
empirical analysis of a sample of the 49 largest international manufacturers of machine
tools shows that patents are a superior mechanism for appropriating the returns on R&D
in this industry. This is indicated by a strong positive relationship between the market
value of the firm and its patenting activities.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Patentierverhalten und industrielle Leistungsfähigkeit: Das Beispiel der
Werkzeugmaschinenindustrie
Am Beispiel einer wichtigen Investitionsgüterindustrie wird in diesem Beitrag der Einfluß
nationaler Patentsysteme auf den Unternehmenserfolg untersucht. Zahlreiche Theorien
gehen davon aus, daß das Innovationsverhalten von Unternehmen von nationalen und
sektoralen Innovationssystemen beeinflußt wird. Das Patentrecht spielt in diesen
Systemen eine wichtige Rolle. Auf der Unternehmensebene beeinflußt es die Möglich-
keiten der Unternehmen Gewinne zu erzielen. Am Beispiel der 49 größten Unternehmen
der internationalen Werkzeugmaschinenindustrie wird nachgewiesen, daß in diesem
Industriezweig Patente ein wichtiges Instrument zur Erzielung von Gewinnen darstellen.
Dies zeigt sich besonders deutlich an der engen positiven Beziehung, die zwischen dem
Marktwert der Unternehmen und ihrem Patentierverhalten empirisch festgestellt wurde.Patenting and Industrial Performance:
The Case of the Machine Tool Industry1
by Manfred Fleischer
1 Introduction
The impact of product innovation and patenting on the performance of firms is a key problem
in capital goods industries. With a few exceptions,2 neither the industrial organization literature
nor the literature on strategic management provide sufficient empirical knowledge regarding
the economics of patenting in capital goods industries. Filling this gap would go far beyond this
paper. However, some insights will be provided based on a case study of the machine tool
industry. Further, the study explores the patent behavior by stressing its relationship to
efficiency and performance. It focuses on the evolution of technological competition,
concentrating on the special case of patenting in the international machine tool industry. This
implies in particular a study of German, Japanese, and U.S. medium-sized manufacturers of
capital goods.
The most remarkable features of any capital goods market include their tremendous
heterogeneity, their relatively low economies of scale, and their moderate absolute cost
advantages. Capital goods markets exhibit a high degree of product innovation and variety, as
is the case in the consumer goods markets. Product innovation for capital goods is different,
however, than with consumer goods. The type of product innovation in capital goods markets
has more to do with the customization of physical product characteristics. This implies that
firms have to obtain, and then maintain, access to the relevant basic technologies in order to
constantly make improvement innovations. In global competition patenting becomes more and
more important for improving the competitiveness of capital goods producers.
The empirical approach of this study is guided by a dynamic resource-based view of the
competitive behavior of the firm as developed by Wernerfeldt (1984) and Albach’s (1996)
growth theory of the firm. These two approaches assume the following: A dynamic process
exists by which firms and industries evolve over time and are shaped by three fundamental
factors—technology, scale economies, and demand. Furthermore, the difference in knowledge
conditions and technology underlying each specific industry is responsible for the pattern
characteristic to that industry. The nature of innovative activity thus accounts for variations in
industry evolution across markets. Product and process innovations by firms thus shift the
competition-efficiency frontier forward. At the level of the firm, the resource-based theory
argues that fit among unique firm-specific rent-yielding resources, strategy, and environment
drives performance results. In a recent paper Johansson and Yip (1992) provide a structural
equation model of global strategy, structure, and performance, which is tested using survey
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data on a small number of American and Japanese multinational firms. However, Johansson
and Yip do not address the role of firm-specific resources (like patents) directly.
In this study, it is argued that in the case of the international capital goods industry competitive
strategies of the firms, and to a lesser extent institutional factors (via the provision of
incentives for R&D), have led to an advantage in global competition. In particular, inventive
behavior and the patenting of products and processes in the large US-market has supported
this advantage. Furthermore, the study found that the exploitation of a second-mover
advantage was considerable in the case of the development of NC machine tools. Based on the
available patent data, however, no clear pattern regarding frequency can be drawn except for
one example: the strong leader effect.
The study begins in section 2 by reviewing important strategy research regarding the capital
goods industry and multidimensional indicators for the measurement of the economic
performance of firms are presented. Finally a two-equation system for modelling the impact of
patenting on performance is developed. In section 3 the sample of firms is introduced and the
data sources are briefly described. The empirical results of the study are discussed in section 4.
2 Analytical Framework
The analytical framework is composed of three parts. First, in section 2.1 patenting in strategy
research is discussed. Second, the instruments to measure the performance of firms are
developed. And finally, a two-equation system to model the impact of patenting strategies on
performance is developed.
2.1 Patenting in Strategy Research
2.1.1 Prior Strategy Measurement Studies in the Machine Tool
Industry
Success factor research (known simply as strategy research) is an important approach in the
study of patenting and performance. Success factor research tries to identify a small number of
key factors which vitally affect the performance of firms. The assumption is that the resulting
impact of these key factors contributes a significant portion of the enterprise’s performance.
The determination of the relevant performance factors involved requires an analysis of the
cause and effect relationships between these factors and at least one performance criteria.
The primary task of success factor research is to answer the question: what degree of
influence does a specific factor have on a certain performance criterion? Its end goal is the
clarification of an effect’s impact on the chosen success factors. It is also important to establish
whether (or in what way) the effect depends on other parameters. Success factor research is
not exclusively about the clarification of causal coherence, but also about the indirect factors
influencing the analysis. Previous success factor research has shown that there can be
considerable problems in the identification and measurement of success factors. It should also
be mentioned that the main approaches of empirical analysis used in this type of research—
multiple regression analysis and cluster analysis—provide only a few insights (if any at all) into
the underlying causality. Researchers have encountered considerable difficulties with the
complexity of their examined issues. This is an essential reason why the analysis here is focused3
only on patenting strategies as a decisive part of the innovation strategy utilized by machine
tool firms. The propensity of firms to patent depends among others on the industry and the
national patent system. That is, it is useful to refer to a few other studies exploring success
factors in the capital goods industry.
Obviously, firms differ in their strategies and strategic moves. However, some theorists argue
that the firms within an industry form groups according to the similarity of their competitive
strategies (Newman 1978). It is assumed that these strategic groups are a stable element of the
market structure and that they influence a firm’s short-term decision-making. It is also assumed
that these groups show persistent performance differences.
There is empirical evidence concerning the existence of strategic groups within a number of
industries (for a review see McGee and Thomas 1986), and specifically within the West
German machine tool industry (Zörgiebel 1983). However, the analysis raises doubts as to
whether such groups persist over time. In a manner similar to Marshall’s concept of industry,
the concept of strategic groups is merely an analytical convenience to group the economic
activities of firms. The basic question regarding the international machine tool industry is:
whether there are groups of firms which choose to react to competitors’ strategic initiatives in
different manners? If this is not the case, then the entire industry would have to be considered
as a single actor, and there would be no differences within the concept of industry at all (Caves
and Porter 1977).
2.2.2 Patenting Strategy Measurement
Patent rights are granted for three main reasons: to promote invention, to encourage the
development and commercial utilization of inventions, and to encourage inventors to make
information on their invention public. Patents are granted upon all inventions meeting the
established standards of novelty and utility.
The patent strategy of individuals or firms is related to the prospect of achieving a monopoly
position and profits due to the development of new products based on the patented invention.
Because of the patent right the patent owner may exercise monopoly power to set prices at
whatever the market accepts. However, few products of the machine tool industry have such a
monopoly position. Nevertheless, research and development is part of the competitive race,
and is carried on to protect demand from invasion by competitors’ new substitutes. With
increasing technological competition, it is clear that no single firm can confidently shelve
research findings and expect to find them still valuable years hence. The crucial question for
the firms in the machine tool industry is whether patents offer much protection against the
disparate ways of doing the same things that are characteristic of their technology. Clearly,
they have to evaluate whether they can put a heavy premium on getting into the market first,
establishing brand preference, and perfecting the product and technology.
A broad but focused product line is one way to exploit the unpredictable results of research in
capital goods industries (see e.g. Fleischer 1997 for an analysis of the product strategy of
German machine tool firms). The availability of capital, technological competence in the
breaking-in stages, and the relationship with the present product line all create momentum
toward exploiting a broad range of research results. Furthermore, multiple-product lines
enhance the value of research because it is easier to figure out all the applications to research4
findings by distributing them throughout the firm and letting the engineers and salesmen look at
them from their unique standpoints.
There are alternative inducements to the patent incentive that have to be considered in
patenting strategy formulation. For example, if an invention can be kept secret it may be
beneficial for the firm not to patent. The important issue here is whether rivals are able to
imitate the invention. In fact, in the machine tool industry innovation strategies with respect to
patenting are quite different. At least two groups emerge when ranked according their
propensity to patent. One group has a high propensity and the other has a low propensity to
patent. The reason is that patent protection is often weak and there can be many solutions to a
technical problem. With machine tools it is often possible to “invent and develop around“ a
given patented solution.
The analysis of patent data is useful to discover the various patenting strategies of firms. As
Brockhoff (1992) has shown, there are at least five variables which have proven valuable in
cross-sectional studies of overall patent data. These are: (1) total number of patent
applications, (2) patents per application, (3) examination rate, (4) waiting time, and (5)
concentration ratio.
Ernst (1995) applied this concept of patenting strategy measurement to a sample of 50 German
machine tool manufacturing firms. He used the following indicators:
x Overall national patent applications. This is measured for each firm and related to the
average patent activity within the sample. The measure is the relative patent activity
(RPA). The adjustment for size leads to patent applications per employee (PA/EMP).
x Patents granted. The rate of patents granted (GP-Rate) was measured as the number of
patents granted over patent applications minus patent applications under examination.
x Valid patents. This is an indicator for the importance of patents, because it is costly to
maintain patents. The rate of valid patents (VP-Rate) is measured as the number of valid
patents over granted patents.
x Overall European patent applications. The share of European patent applications per firm
is measured relative to the average European patent applications within the research
sample (REPA).
x Patents cited. The citation of granted patents in subsequent patent documents is recorded
in relation to the total number of patents granted (CIT).
x Concentration of patents in subclasses. This concentration ratio is defined as an entropy
measure (CON). A low value indicates a high concentration of patent application in a few
subclasses, whereas a high value indicates a high dispersion of patents over patent
subclasses.
Using these measures Ernst (1995) has identified four different clusters of patenting behavior.
These clusters are somehow natural since they are based on the propensity to patent. The four
clusters with the respective percentages of the 50 firms are:
x Cluster 1 “Selective Patentees“ (40%): Low patenting activity; high rate of granted and
valid patents; above average concentration ratio.5
x Cluster 2 “Unsuccessful Patentees“ (18%): Low patenting activity; low rate of granted
and valid patents; high concentration ratio; low citation ratio.
x Cluster 3 “Internationally Highly Active Patentees“ (32%): High patenting activity; high
rate of granted and valid patents; high amount of European patent applications; low
concentration ratio.
x Cluster 4 “Small Highly Active Patentees“ (10%): High patenting activity; low rate of
granted patents and high rate of valid patents; low concentration ratio; high citation ratio.
Ernst (1995) used sales based performance indicators to assess the impact of patenting
behavior on performance. The indicators used to test the impact are: relative sales growth,
relative sales per employee, and relative development of sales per employee (1984-1991).
Based on these three performance measures Ernst concludes that patent-active firms show
better performance. Patent-active firms with narrow technological focus outperform all other
firms on these three indicators. He has identified the lowest performance values for the
“Unsuccessful Patentees“ of Cluster 2.
Ernst has provided a very comprehensive and insightful analysis of a large sample of German
machine tool firms. However, two reservations should be made. First, measures of sales
performance are very limited for assessing the economic performance of firms. Second, the
study of a national industry (although with strong export orientation) can offer only an
indication of what happens with respect to global competition. Still to be answered are
questions like, how important are patents granted by the U.S. Patent Office for global
competition in the machine tool industry? Our analysis will deal with these two issues. This is
done by first discussing the appropriateness of performance indicators, and second by testing
the impact of patent behavior on the performance of a sample of 49 machine tool firms from
major machine tool producing countries.
2.2 Measurement of Performance
2.2.1 Limitations of Unidimensional Criteria
There are several problems that must be addressed when choosing performance criteria. With
respect to the unit of analysis, a decision must be made as to whether performance should be
measured on the level of the business unit, the firm, or the industry. It should then be decided
which type of performance criteria to accept.  Are measures based on accounting data
appropriate?  Or is information concerning capacity utilization and productivity more
appropriate?  Finally, one has to fix the reference point and the time period for the
measurement.
The explanatory power of a single one-dimensional performance criterion is limited.
Accounting criteria might be biased. One has a certain amount of leverage in drawing up a
balance sheet for instance, there are possibilities to choose among various rules for the
valuation and depreciation of assets. Criteria like capacity utilization or productivity are
restricted to just one element of production—be it the capacity of machines or the available
labor. The important market share criteria are generally missing, as are the accumulated
resources invested in its achievement. The same is true for quality criteria. The weaknesses of6
using a single criterion, suggest adoption of a measurement approach based on
multidimensional criteria.
Two criteria which have proven their validation in numerous empirical studies are the hexagon
criterion of Albach, and the Z value of Altman. The choice of the dimensions of the hexagon
criterion are based on a systematic analysis of excellent firms. Since these are important
dimensions for the study of global competition we will introduce the hexagon criterion briefly.
The Z value is based on a multifactor model developed by Altman for the purpose of
bankruptcy prediction. The dimensions are similar to the ones of the hexagon criterion. The Z
value based on Altman’s discriminant function might be regarded as an index to discriminate
between bankrupt and healthy companies—it is essentially an index of the company’s overall
well-being.
2.2.2 The Hexagon Criterion of Albach
The hexagon criterion of Albach is composed of six single measures. These six measures are
similar to those used by Peters and Waterman (1982) in their comprehensive empirical field
work on excellent firms.3 The overall criteria was designed by Albach as a model hexagon,
where the surface of each of the six measures defines one coordinate of the hexagon (as with
the surface of a radar chart). For the selection of the excellent firms, the performance measures
(averaged over a long period) are used to define the hexagon. The surface for each single firm
is then used to get the ranking of the firms in the whole sample. The greater the surface, the
better the performance of the firm. The six measures defining the hexagon are:
1.  the growth rate of fixed assets,
2.  the growth rate of equity capital,
3.  the ratio of market to book value of the firm,
4.  return on total capital,
5.  return on equity, and
6.  return on sales.4
This combined criteria measures profitability, the achieved growth, and the intangible assets of
the firms. The scaling of the single measures has an impact on the surface of the hexagon. It
defines—jointly with the formula for the surface of the hexagon—the value of the overall
criteria. The scaling and surface definition express the implicit weighting procedure of the
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single criterion. As such is the case, they remain arbitrary, and it is reasonable to keep this
reservation in mind.
Reservations concerning particular single criteria are to be taken seriously. As Davis and Kay
(1990) note, capital intensity and gearing interfere with the ranking of firms, and while the
usual profitability measures capture some aspect of the success of firms, none gives the whole
picture. While Davis and Kay are in search of a single measure,5 however, this study rests on
two combined measures—the hexagon criterion of Albach and the Z value of Altman. Albach
(1987), Altman (1968; 1971), and Peters and Waterman (1982) among others have shown that
these two criteria are capable of discriminating excellently performing firms from poorly
performing ones. It should be noted, however, that new measures, such as the added value
measure by Davis and Kay (1990) will certainly enrich the field of performance measurement.
Figure 1 illustrates the hexagonal criteria for two German machine tool firms. In order to
obtain a more equal scaling of the axis, the ratio “market value to book value“ was multiplied
by 0.01 for the purpose of presentation. For the computation of the proper hexagonal values,
the formula for the hexagon was applied. The graphic representation of the hexagon’s criteria
has also to be adjusted for cases in which a single variable becomes negative. For this situation,
computation rules have to be applied. In cases where two values are negative, they result in a
negative expression and are subtracted (contrary to arithmetic where the product would be
positive and it would have to be added). For more detail concerning the computation of the
variables see Albach and Moerke (1996).
2.2.3 Efficiency Measures
Method
The production of goods and services is technically efficient when they are produced with the
minimum value of inputs. This is obtained by minimizing the cost of each product-related
activity. Technical efficiency has to be distinguished from allocative efficiency, which is related
to market performance. Business practice shows that improvements in technical efficiency are
achieved by utilizing existing inputs more efficiently. To express this idea, Leibenstein (1966)
introduced the socio-economic notion of X-efficiency and, correspondingly, X-inefficiency. X-
inefficiency is utilized in cases where there seems to be the possibility of increasing efficiency
by a new combination of inputs or more intensive use of inputs. For the purposes of this paper,
the meaning of X-efficiency and technical efficiency coincide.
The measurement of technical efficiency requires some sort of standard of optimal or best
practice efficiency. For this requirement, economic theory has provides the concept of the
production function. For the purpose of empirical testing, one needs a well-defined and
specified production function for each product-related activity. Based on the typical production
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technology in plants in the mechanical engineering industry, some preliminary estimations of
the Cobb-Douglas production function were made.
There are a number of critical points to be addressed. The most crucial one is the assumption
that the input factors are nearly perfectly substitutable. In the long-run, this can be realistically
assumed.
Average and frontier production functions for German industries are reviewed in Albach
(1980). New estimations for the major German industries are reported in Albach (1996). A
survey of the recent literature is included in Greene (1996). No serious attempt is made in this
study to estimate a vintage model to capture technical progress since the information on capital
inputs of machine tool firms in the sample is limitedfor a significant number of firms, data
concerning investment is only available for four years. Thus, two simple versions of the
following methods of estimating the frontier production function were used: The linear
programming model approach6, and the fixed effects approach using the least squares dummy
variable (LSDV) estimator to estimate a set of firm specific constants (see Greene 1996,
pp. 45-47).
Both approaches are based on the Cobb-Douglas production function. The goal function of the
linear programming model includes a Cobb-Douglas term as well as the LSDV model
specification.
Input and Output Definitions
The data are based on the Global Vantage Database from Standard & Poor's. As the output
measure X real value added could not be used.
Usually, the output as real value added is used and defined as:
Sales
+/– Increase or decrease of the inventories of finished goods and
work-in progress
+            Other own cost capitalized
=            Total output
– Expenses for raw materials, supplies, and purchased merchandise
– Other operating expenses
– Cost of purchases services
–            Depreciation and adjustment on plant, equipment, and intangible assets
= Value added (real net output)
Capital K was defined as the stock of machinery and equipment (including office equipment).
Due to the short observation period, no particular capital measurement, such as the perpetual
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inventory method, could be applied. Instead, capital was defined as the average of the stocks of
machinery and equipment, minus depreciation at a rate of 14.5 percent a year, plus the annual
average of two years investment. The average of the investment was taken to adjust for the
fluctuation in investment in short periods of observation. Capital in period t is then defined as
follows:
Kt = (1 – r) Kt–1 + 0.5 (It + It–1)
with U as the depreciation rate and It as the new investment in period t minus reductions in
machinery and equipment (disinvestment) plus transfer.
Labor  L is defined as salaries and wages plus the employer’s share of social security
contributions, payments into old age pension funds, and other benefit costs. These labor cost
then are deflated by a labor cost index.
Due to the limitations of available data a still different specification was used for the
estimations. Thus, the only feasible specification was one using—as inputs—the number of
employees, and the value for property, plant, and equipment. Sales was used to measure the
output. Thus, a practically classical production function with two variable inputs—capital K
and labor L—was estimated using a frontier production function approach.
2.3 Modelling the Impact of Patenting on Performance
2.3.1 The Patent Equation
Research and development expenditure is an important part of the competitive strategy of the
firm. There are a number of main elements in the R&D expenditure decision. First of all, R&D
expenditure is competing for a share of the total supply of a firm’s funds, along with its internal
competitors of market investment and investments in property, plant, and equipment. Decisions
on R&D projects have to go to the same decision process as other investment decisions.
However, it seems to be more difficult to forecast the market profitability of R&D projects
when compared to other investment decisions.
There is a two-way causation regarding R&D and profitability. On the one hand profits
generate the funds for R&D expenditures, and on the other R&D expenditures may change
and/or strengthen the competitive position of firms and thereby generate further profits.
Because of the high degree of uncertainty of R&D, a large part of R&D is financed out of
retained profits.
The high uncertainty is one reason why the measurement of R&D effort plays a crucial role in
economic analysis.7 The most common hypothesis in these studies is: that more important
innovations require (on average) a larger share of innovation costs allocated for R&D than less
important innovations. A second hypothesis states that: larger firms devote a greater
percentage of their total innovation costs to R&D than smaller firms. And a third assumption
is: that the more experienced a firm becomes with R&D, the greater is the likelihood that it will
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learn and, thus, become more efficient. From this assumption, one would expect experienced
firms to use a smaller share of their innovation expenditures for R&D.
The question addressed by much of the economic literature concerning product innovation is:
whether patenting activity can be used as a proxy for modelling and measuring the output of
the innovation process? There are good reasons to use this indicator to model the innovation
process (see a review of the literature in Scherer and Ross 1990). A first step in modelling the
relationship between innovative inputs and innovative output is to utilize a simple production
function relationship of the type used by Bound et al. (1984):
PAT = aRDE
1
where PAT is the annual number of patents granted by the U.S. Patent Office and RD is the
firm’s expenditure on R&D. For the linear regression, the logarithmic values are used, that is:
lg PAT =  lg a +  E1  lg RD  with the estimated coefficients for the entire sample:
lg PAT =  1.07   +   0.61 lg RD              R
2
Adj. = 0.19       F = 26.1         N = 107
         (8.41)        (5.12)
where the t-values are listed in parentheses. The estimated coefficient of lgRD is the elasticity
of the innovative output (measured as the number of patents) with respect to the innovative
input (measured as R&D expenditures). The estimated elasticity of 0.61 is somewhat different
from the elasticities for R&D and patents estimated by Bound et al. (1984. Based on 2,582
firms and ranging from 0.32 to 0.38 ). The elasticity is measured for the means of PAT and
RD. This equation will be estimated as the patent equation in a two-equations system.
2.3.2 The Performance Equation
It has been argued that high profits can be regarded as a major criterion of good performance
in capital goods industries. But what if these are subject to measurement errors? Some have
argued that reported profit rates provide a limited understanding of “real“ economic
profitability. For example, Fisher and McGowan (1983), and later Benston (1985), have
questioned whether accounting profits can be used to draw conclusions about economic
performance. In this paper it was argued that this can be compensated for by using multi-
dimensional measures, such as the hexagon criterion or the Z value. However, it is recognized
that accounting practices tend to distort meaningful comparisons. These distortions might then
obscure the true relationships between profitability and other variables (see Mueller 1990 for a
discussion of the arguments concerning “accounting returns versus economic returns“).
In modelling the performance of a firm, we use the performance indicators discussed above.
Although the efficiency of R&D needs an explanation in a number of variables internal to the
firm and its R&D department, here we will focus on the economic core relationship. We
recognize the argument that R&D is a very complex process involving a wide range of
managerial, behavioral, and institutional influences. Therefore we refer to a descriptive analysis
of the development of global competition with respect to the development of NC/CNC
machine tools in the United States, Europe, and Japan (Fleischer 1997). This is very much in
line with the results achieved in the econometric analysis.11
Much attention has been focused in recent years on the measurement of intangible capital like
R&D and patents (see e.g. Hall 1993, Jaffe 1986, and Pakes 1985). Since there is the
mentioned concern about the use of accounting profits for the measurement of profit and there
are problems in measuring intangible capital it is reasonable to use the market value of a firm.
The market value of a firm must be equal to the sum of the replacement costs of each of the
assets of the firm. This value is also equivalent to the present value of the flow of expected net
revenues.
In modelling the market value relationship we use two measures of efficiency, that is the
technical efficiency and the R&D efficiency as expressed by the patent rate, using the number
of patents per 1,000 employees.
3 Sample and Data
3.1 The Sample: Machine Tool Firms with Published Accounts
Considerable structural changes occurred in the 1970s and 1980s in the international machine
tool industry. There are four characteristics of this development (see Carlsson 1990). During
the 1980s, distribution of the world production of machine tools moved from the traditional
suppliers in the U.S.A. and Western Europe to firms in Japan. The Japanese gains are partly
related to resulting losses for the West German and U.S. machine tool firms, as well as for
firms in certain East European countries. This change is a result of increasing international
trade and its specialization. This is particularly true for Japan, where the globalization of the
automotive industry has played a decisive role for the development of the machine tool
industry. During this process, conventional machine tools were replaced by numerically
controlled machine tools. This development is still reflected in the most recent statistics of the
world machine tool industry. 
Worldwide, the largest machine tools manufacturer in 1995 was Fanuc. Fanuc has U.S.$ 1.138
billion (USD) in annual sales. This is primarily due to the sale of machine tools and
computerized numerical control equipment. Second is Amada, primarily an engineering and
marketing firm, with sales of U.S.$ 1.104 billion. The family-owned firm, Yamazaki Mazak, is
third with sales of U.S.$ 1.021 billion. Fourth place is held by Fuji Machine (U.S.$ 893 million)
and coming in fifth is Okuma with U.S.$ 722.7 million. The U.S. firm of Gidding & Lewis is
ranked sixth (U.S.$ 659.4 million). Only one German machine tool manufacturer is among the
largest 10 firms—seventh place Trumpf with U.S.$  645.7 million in annual sales in 1995.
Number eight is the Japanese Mori Seiki (U.S.$ 622.2 million). The final two are the U.S. firm,
Western Atlas Inc. (U.S.$ 558 million), and the Fiat-owned, Comau Group in Italy, with sales
of U.S.$ 547.2 million. Out of these ten of the world’s largest manufacturers of machine tools
six are included in our analysis. They are: Fanuc, Amada, Okuma, Gidding & Lewis, Mori
Seiki, and Comau.
The selection of the firms for this study was based on the availability of the information needed
to compute the discussed performance measures. This required information from the both the
balance sheets and income statements of the firms. Usually, such information is only available
for stock-companies. Based on a list of manufacturers of machine tools as classified in the
Global Vantage database (GV) the present sample was generated. Firms that do not have the12
majority of their activities in the machine tool business were excluded. Among these are firms
like Seiko. The correct sample was defined by using the directories of the German, Japanese,
and U.S. associations of machine tool builders. The result is a sample of 49 firms (see table 1).
3.2 The Data
Performance Data
The data used are from the Global Vantage database issued in July 1997. This database
contains financial information about industrial, financial, and insurance corporations quoted on
the world’s largest stock exchanges. The database is constructed from the annual business
reports of the stock corporations. This database is primarily used in international comparative
studies. It has the advantage that the data are made comparable, that is, flow variables are
converted by using the average currency exchange rate for the reporting period. For stock
variables the exchange rate for the end of the periods are used.
The availability of certain single items on the balance sheets and income statements varies due
to the different reporting standards applying to the firms in the three countries. Further, most
of the firms are medium-sized and they do not generally follow sophisticated reporting
standards. However, the GV database reports the missing values for cases where the data is
available. This is particularly true for labor costs. We have checked this for a number of
German firms. Note, that the incompleteness regarding important single items is a serious
drawback of the GV database for econometric performance studies.
Finally, it should be noted that a number of companies have changed their accounting systems
due to legal and tax considerations. In the new system, the former core of the company (the
AG) becomes a Holding. This implies that they no longer report the realistic sales and
employment figures for the AG. These figures are only available using consolidated financial
statements. This means that the unit of analysis has to be changed from the AG to the Group
(“Konzern“) using information from the consolidated balance sheets and income statements.
There is no longer a choice of using unconsolidated or consolidated accounts for the purpose
of an empirical analysis. However, these changes occurred by the end of the 1980s in the case
of Japan and Germany. This has to be recognized when interpreting the data.
Patent Data
Patent data was gathered for the period of 1986-1995. Four separate databases were used for
the patent counts. These four were used to acquire information concerning differences in the
propensity to patent. The choice of the patent data was mainly driven by the fact that the
largest machine tool producing countries are Japan and Germany, and the two largest markets
for machine tools are the U.S.A. and Europe. This implied using patent data from the U.S.,
European, Japanese, and German patent offices.
An alternative strategy would have been to directly use a database which is specialized in
providing access to international patent applications, like the DERWENT database. However,
we decided to focus our analysis on data from the USPTO, the EPO, the JPO, and the German
Patent Office.
U.S. patent data was collected by searching the U.S. Patent Database on the Worldwide Web.13
European patent data was searched for on the ESPACE-ACCESS CD-ROMs with the
European and PCT International Patent Application Bibliography.
An efficient access to Japanese patent data was provided by the English version of the JPO
Patent Search Database located at the Technische Hochschule Ilmenau. The “original“ JPO-
WWW-Database was still not complete at the time of the search in April and May 1998 and
was time consuming to work with.
Information on patent applications at the German Patent Office were derived from the PATOS
CD-ROM as supplied by Wila Verlag / Bertelsmann Informations Service.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Variation of Patenting in the Sample
There is an enormous difference in the absolute number of entries. For the JPO the number is
13,175; for the EPO 3,373; and for the USPTO 2,507; for the GPO 635. The Japanese firms
have filed 3.9 times more applications with the JPO as the whole sample has filed with the
EPO. This result for the machine tool industry corresponds with what is already known about
the Japanese patent behavior, that is the propensity to patent is higher in Japan compared to
Europe and the U.S.A. (see e.g. van Leuven 1996; Schramm, Ludwig, and Töpfer 1997).
There is no patent application from a non-Japanese firm at the JPO for our sample due to the
limited coverage of the JPO patent abstract database used.
When looking at the patent shares an interesting result emerges regarding the entries with the
patent offices. From the total of 19,690 entries, 8,861 or 45 percent are due to patenting effort
of the FANUC corporation. That highlights an enormous technological leadership which can
only be assessed in more detail with respect to both the fields of technology and its rivals in
terms of global competition.
The distribution pattern of entries for the firms in the sample are shown in figure 2. The figure
is based on one of the patenting efficiency measures, that is the number of patents per 1000
employees. The four quantile plots show the fraction of observations on the x-axis, and the
respective values of the patent efficiency variable on the y-axis. Three patterns are very similar.
These are the U.S. patents, the JPO applications, and the GPO applications. These three show
for the upper quartile (75-100 percent) a concentration of the highest patent efficiency as
measured by patent applications per 1000 employees. The pattern is different for the EPO.
Here a sharp break comes with 95 percent of the observations. This is due to the counting of
the so-called Euro-PCT filings made by FANUC. 72 percent of the applications at EPO can be
attributed to FANUC. Thus, one might argue that there is a strong impact by FANUC on the
patenting pattern of the sample. This is obviously true, however, FANUC is a key-player in
global competition in the machine tool industry. That is the main reason for not dropping this
firm from the sample.14
4.2 The Impact of Patents on Performance
4.2.1 Estimation of Single Equations
Our econometric estimations using the whole set of performance measures has led to four
preliminary results. First, variables based on patents granted by the USPTO lead to
significantly better results as compared with JPO and GPO applications, that is there is a
positive and significant impact of patenting activity and the various measures of performance.
The reason might be that patents granted by the USPTO are a better indicator of intangible
capital embodied in patents than mere patent applications. And, because of the arguments
made in the literature with respect to the importance of U.S. patents, there is also an impact of
the large U.S. market and the fact that USPTO only publish patents granted. However, as can
be seen from our data and from comparable estimation results, EPO is reaching a similar
position.
Second, a clear pattern emerged with respect to the performance indicators when using patents
as the single set of performance determinants. We found a significant, although not strong
positive relationship between the hexagon criterion and patenting as well as with the Z value
and patenting. The Z value performed slightly better. From a purely empirical perspective we
were surprised by how well the market value as a performance measure performed. That is, we
found a very significant and positive relationship between patenting activity and the market
value of the firm.
Third, as expected, the lagged variable of patent activity is a good predictor of performance. In
particular, a lag of one year led to the best predictions.
Fourth, patent activity as measured by patent applications with the German Patent Office had a
negative impact on performance when patent indicators for all four patent offices were used in
the estimated equation. A part from problems of multicollinearity this might be due to the fact
that the 635 applications in Germany account for only 3.2 percent of the overall patenting
activity. Further, German firms in the sample have experienced significant losses since 1990.
4.2.2 Estimation of the Two-Equation System
The goal of the estimation of the two-equation system is to test in a simple manner the
efficiency of the innovative process. This is done by estimating a knowledge production
function (“patenting equation“) and a “performance equation“ as developed in section 2.3. The
latter equation describes the relationship between the market valuation of a firm and its
productive (technical) efficiency and its efficiency to patent.
To estimate the system of equations we assumed a seemingly unrelated regression model.
Seemingly unrelated regression appear to be joint estimates of several regression models, each
with their own error term. They can be used to estimate a system of equations in case of cross-
sectional time-series data.15
The following two equations were estimated using the “sureg“ procedure as implemented in
the STATA Version 5:
(1) lg (U.S.-Patents)  = lg(R&D Expenditures)
“pauslg“ “xrd_lg“
(2) Market Value = Technical Efficiency  + U.S.-Patents per 1000 Employees
   “mkvali“ “eff_lp“ “pus_em“
The variable definitions and parameter estimations are shown in table 2 and 3. All parameter
estimates are significantly different from zero. The patent equation explains 19 percent of the
variance of the innovative output “patents“. The performance equation explains 56 percent of
the variance of the market value of the firm. This result corresponds to numerous fixed- and
random-effect model estimations we did for section 4.2.1.
5 Conclusion
Using the case of an important capital goods industry the paper examines the impact of the
national patent system on the performance of firms. Many theories attempt to explain the
firms’ innovative behavior using the concepts of national and sectorial systems of innovation.
Patents play a particularly important role in these systems. At the level of the firm their
importance rests on the possibility to appropriate profits. The empirical analysis of a sample of
49 manufacturers of machine tools show that patents are a superior mechanism for
appropriating the returns on R&D in this industry. This is indicated by a strong positive
relationship between the market value of the firm and its patenting activities. Recently, Foray
(1995) has argued that there are two types of patents systems, the P-system (used in most
western economies) and the D-system (the Japanese system), which have a different impact on
the innovative behavior of firms. However, our results underscore the importance of the U.S.
patent system for the global competitiveness of firms in a medium-sized capital goods industry.
Using this newly constructed dataset on manufacturers of machine tools we document that
Japanese firms have invested far more in domestic patenting than their global rivals. This paper
suggests that this is due to the narrow scope of the Japanese patent law with its weak novelty
requirements which rewards those who reverse engineer. However, our results underscore the
importance of the U.S. patent system for the global competitiveness of firms in a medium-sized
capital goods industry. Using a newly constructed dataset on manufacturers of machine tools
we document that Japanese firms have invested far more in domestic patenting than their
global rivals. This result contradicts - at least for the machine tool industry - Ordover’s (1991)
conclusion that the Japanese system penalizes those firms who wish to protect their major
technological breakthroughs. It may be that the D-system of protection for intellectual
property could be effective in meeting the needs of a technological follower as well as the
needs of a technological leader when being supported by the P-system.16
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Figure 1:  Hexagon Criterion for German Machine Tool Firms, 1991-1994
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sTable 1:  The Sample of 49 Machine Tool Firms: Performance and Patent Indicators 
ID Number Company Name Country Number  Sales in Pretax Operat. R&D Patents Granted    Patent Appl.    Patent Appl.    Patent Appl.
of Empl. mill. USD ROA Margin Intensity       by USPTO         at EPO         at JPO at German PO
GVKEY No CONM CINC EMP SALE PROA OMAD RD_SALES         PAT_US        PAT_EU         PAT_JP       PAT_DE
1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 1986-95 Share 1986-95 Share 1986-95 Share 1986-95 Share
100059 1 600 GROUP PLC (THE) GBR 1420 229.07 12.14 10.68 1.27 3 0.12 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
101710 2 AGIE HOLDING AG CHE 1120 263.40 3.26 5.12 . 41 1.64 55 1.63 0 0.00 63 9.92
101551 3 AIDA ENGINEERING LTD JPN 680 309.24 3.55 6.80 0.02 50 1.99 36 1.07 544 4.13 7 1.10
1297 4 ALLIED PRODUCTS USA 1600 260.86 10.99 9.51 . 21 0.84 5 0.15 0 0.00 0 0.00
100234 5 AMADA CO LTD JPN 1310 1032.09 1.36 -1.65 4.34 214 8.54 87 2.58 2401 18.22 45 7.09
200152 6 AMADA SONOIKE CO LTD JPN 470 354.31 1.22 -1.74 0.43 1 0.04 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
200153 7 AMADA WASINO CO LTD JPN 480 204.28 -3.57 -5.58 2.31 7 0.28 3 0.09 0 0.00 6 0.94
2433 8 BROWN & SHARPE MFG CO USA 2370 320.90 0.89 3.72 2.42 17 0.68 26 0.77 0 0.00 0 0.00
2999 9 CHICAGO RIVET & MACHINE CO USA 300 23.72 17.07 13.95 . 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
3041 10 CINCINNATI MILACRON INC USA 11790 1649.30 11.41 6.64 2.08 198 7.90 101 2.99 0 0.00 3 0.47
15904 11 COMAU FIANANZIARI ITA 4050 1048.01 3.51 3.64 . 36 1.44 38 1.13 0 0.00 11 1.73
102904 12 DANIELI ITA 698.36 1.96 -0.44 . 107 4.27 159 4.71 0 0.00 1 0.16
202040 13 ENSHU LTD JPN 980 284.71 -4.39 -1.13 . 1 0.04 3 0.09 213 1.62 0 0.00
103526 14 EX-CELL-O HOLDING AG DEU 1420 246.93 -9.82 -4.55 . 96 3.83 0 0.00 0 0.00 6 0.94
4568 15 FANSTEEL INC/DE USA 910 102.60 7.40 4.32 . 13 0.52 1 0.03 0 0.00 2 0.31
100048 16 FANUC LTD JPN 2120 1572.39 9.64 27.86 . 955 38.09 2429 72.01 5476 41.56 1 0.16
16475 17 GIDDINGS & LEWIS INC/WI USA 3970 730.55 3.43 9.37 0.53 17 0.68 3 0.09 0 0.00 10 1.57
101937 18 GILDEMEISTER AG DEU 2570 521.16 -2.46 -3.49 . 9 0.36 22 0.65 0 0.00 32 5.04
5181 19 GLEASON CORP USA 1460 197.05 10.64 10.24 2.58 63 2.51 70 2.08 0 0.00 1 0.16
210325 20 HERMLE BERTHOLD AG DEU 430 60.67 7.00 4.29 . 0 0.00 11 0.33 0 0.00 12 1.89
101899 21 HITACHI KOKI CO LTD JPN 1185.19 3.51 4.82 . 253 10.09 29 0.86 1912 14.51 195 30.71
102538 22 HITACHI SEIKI CO LTD JPN 1100 340.02 -5.03 -7.03 2.10 7 0.28 4 0.12 512 3.89 2 0.31
101974 23 HOWA MACHINERY LTD JPN 2120 376.57 1.80 0.90 0.05 0 0.00 39 1.16 0 0.00 6 0.94
203247 24 IKEGAI CORP JPN . . . . 2 0.08 1 0.03 48 0.36 0 0.00
100449 25 IWKA AG DEU 7720 1483.16 4.71 3.34 . ........
100236 26 MAKINO MILLING MACHINE CO LT JPN 482.78 1.48 1.82 . 3 0.12 4 0.12 341 2.59 2 0.31
102178 27 MIKRON HOLDING AG CHE 1380 277.03 4.32 5.78 . 0 0.00 3 0.09 0 0.00 7 1.10
7515 28 MONARCH MACHINE TOOL CO USA 700 114.99 1.15 1.06 1.46 15 0.60 3 0.09 0 0.00 1 0.16
102256 29 MORI SEIKI CO LTD JPN 1740 692.61 3.29 1.93 . 9 0.36 6 0.18 124 0.94 2 0.31
220302 30 MULLER-WEINGARTEN AG-MASCHIN DEU 2200 278.49 -12.55 -13.17 . 7 0.28 44 1.30 0 0.00 85 13.39
7873 31 NEWCOR INC USA 890 116.63 1.62 2.45 . 8 0.32 1 0.03 0 0.00 0 0.00
100632 32 NIIGATA ENGINEERING CO LTD JPN 3120 1670.97 -0.46 -0.54 0.08 18 0.72 21 0.62 719 5.46 0 0.00
102908 33 O-M LTD JPN 500 103.14 -2.85 -4.24 0.16 2 0.08 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
102682 34 OKK CORPORATION JPN 760 201.28 -8.60 -10.80 1.41 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
205367 35 OKUMA & HOWA MACHINERY LTD JPN 520 161.48 -2.22 -1.41 2.20 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
100064 36 OKUMA CORPORATION JPN 1350 725.07 2.10 1.56 2.95 106 4.23 1 0.03 0 0.00 6 0.94
101841 37 PITTLER MASCHINENFABRIK AG DEU 660 79.61 -7.22 -2.48 . 0 0.00 8 0.24 0 0.00 3 0.47
211460 38 SCHUMAG AG DEU 1000 167.72 17.72 12.45 . 3 0.12 4 0.12 0 0.00 0 0.00
102678 39 SCINTILLA AG CHE 2060 705.97 13.25 7.59 . 5 0.20 19 0.56 0 0.00 36 5.67
9556 40 SPX CORP USA 8300 1098.10 0.20 3.92 1.34 59 2.35 4 0.12 0 0.00 4 0.63
102849 41 TEIJIN SEIKI CO LTD JPN 1500 644.92 -6.06 -5.03 0.70 0 0.00 78 2.31 601 4.56 4 0.63
209100 42 TOKYO KIKAI SEISAKUSHO LTD JPN 610 235.34 1.69 3.00 0.29 90 3.59 14 0.42 224 1.70 31 4.88
102167 43 TOSHIBA MACHINE CO LTD JPN 2920 1069.56 -3.28 -3.66 0.48 47 1.87 4 0.12 0 0.00 16 2.52
209195 44 TOYODA MACHINE WORKS LTD JPN 4510 1432.29 2.59 1.95 2.62 1 0.04 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
101962 45 TRAUB AG DEU 2370 364.19 -2.87 -8.15 . 8 0.32 20 0.59 0 0.00 28 4.41
101077 46 TSUGAMI CORPORATION JPN 124.07 -3.12 -0.85 . 3 0.12 3 0.09 60 0.46 0 0.00
220393 47 USINES METALLURGIQUES DE VAL CHE 36.96 3.69 4.05 . 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
209468 48 VERSON INTER'L GROUP PLC GBR 1460 167.74 -4.64 0.27 . 7 0.28 3 0.09 0 0.00 0 0.00
209454 49 WALTER AG DEU 1120 187.82 16.00 12.35 . 5 0.20 11 0.33 0 0.00 7 1.10
Totals 90060 24633.30 2507 100 3373 100 13175 100 635 10021
Table 2: Variable Definitions for a Two-Equation System
Dependent variables
PAT_US Number of patents granted by the U.S. Patent Office—taken as the
log-form (lg).
MKVALI Market value of the firms (measured in millions of U.S. dollars).
The value is based on the price of shares and the issued stocks.
Independent variables
XRD R&D expenditures—taken as the log-form (lg).
EFF_LP Annual technical efficiency of the firms based on a Cobb-Douglas
production function and an estimation using a linear programming
approach.
PUS_EM Patenting efficiency as measured by the number of patents granted
by the U.S. Patent Office.22
Table 3: Estimated Regression Coefficients Using Data for 1986-1995 for European,





lg U.S. Patents Market Value
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(7.32) (-5.23)




U.S. Patents per 1000 Empl. 79.76***
(8.23)
N obs. 90 90
F 23.45*** 66.83***
R2 0.19 0.57
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